Condorcet Method
How it works: Compare every pair of candidates head-to-head using
the full ranking data. A Condorcet winner beats every other candidate in pairwise
comparison. If no such candidate exists (a cycle), fall back to IRV.
Pairwise Margins
Each cell shows how many voters prefer the row candidate over the column candidate.
| Chinese | Indian | Italian | Mexican | Thai | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chinese | - | 41–54 | 45–55 | 75–20 | 29–46 |
| Indian | 54–41 | - | 49–35 | 59–20 | 49–46 |
| Italian | 55–45 | 35–49 | - | 35–20 | 55–16 |
| Mexican | 20–75 | 20–59 | 20–35 | - | 20–46 |
| Thai | 46–29 | 46–49 | 16–55 | 46–20 | - |
Beats Matrix
1 = row candidate beats column candidate. A Condorcet winner has all 1s in their row.
| Chinese | Indian | Italian | Mexican | Thai | Wins | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chinese | - | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Indian | 1 | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| Italian | 1 | 0 | - | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| Mexican | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 |
| Thai | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | - | 2 |
Condorcet winner: Indian
The Compromise Candidate
Indian has only 4% first-preference support — dead last under FPTP. But it's everyone's acceptable compromise. In every head-to-head matchup, more voters prefer Indian over the alternative. This is exactly the scenario Condorcet methods are designed to detect: a broadly acceptable candidate that plurality voting misses entirely.